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   1. Introduction 
 
      Firm size is an important economic issue because it relates to job 
creation and growth (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). Furthermore, there is a 
large disparity of firm size across countries and industries. US firms are for 
instance on aggregate larger than their Spanish and Italian counterparts. 
Moreover, the US economy seems to adapt better to economic cycles 
than the European one. Recently there have been different attempts to 
explain the nature of these differences, although few studies have 
included institutional factors. This paper contributes to this line of 
research through the inclusion of institutional effects on firm size. Labour 
market institutions and product market regulations may play an 
important role in determining firm size, since they create indirect costs to 
firms that may discourage or limit firm activity. In particular, we 
empirically analyze the role of labour market institutions like Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) and Product Market Regulation (PMR) on firm 
size via entry. We argue that these regulations create costs to firms and 
that those firms subject to finance sca r c i t y  w i l l  b e  m o r e  a f f e c t e d  b y  
these regulations. 
 
          On the one hand, interactions between labour markets and 
product markets have received considerable attention in recent years. 
EPL is generally thought to affect firm cost structure; it leads to higher 
direct costs and thus lower employment (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003). At 
the same time, barriers to product markets are considered opportunity 
costs for the firm. Thus both EPL and entry regulation impact firm entry 
and job creation (Pissarides, 2001). Both EPL and PMR are costs that firms 
have to face and then discourage entrepreneurship.  
 
          On the other hand, the financial literature extensively analyzes 
finance market imperfections and their effects on firm decision making. 
Moral hazard, adverse selection, and search externalities in credit 
markets are relevant not only for corporate finance but also for labour 
economics. The argument is that firms are not able to finance all their 
investment projects by themselves, and hence they need to raise 
external capital. However capital markets are not perfect and firms may 
experience difficulties in obtaining external finance. The higher financial 
development, the easier the access of firms to external finance. If they 
faced high costs associated with EPL and PMR, it would create an 
underinvestment problem: investment projects may not be undertaken 
as fund availability reduces. Therefore strict EPL and PMR might have a 
negative effect on firm structure (and indirectly on growth), in particular 
in less developed financial markets. In the same spirit, Blanchard and 
Tirole (2003) claim that high costs associated with unemployment costs 
may potentially make things more difficult to firms, imposing a high utility 
cost on the small entrepreneur, or preventing the larger firm to invest the 
funds for better purposes. Therefore the analysis of the interactions of 
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differences observed in the OECD countries. 
 
         Our work is related to several strands of the literature. The first one is 
the finance literature. There are several papers that have established an 
empirical link between financial development and firm behaviour. In 
particular, well-developed financial markets have seen shown to make it 
easier for firms to attract external financing for their investment needs 
(Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). 
Therefore, firm debt structure differs across institutional frameworks and 
financial market imperfections affect firm financing and investment 
decisions (Rajan and Zingales (1998), Demirguç-Kunt and Maksimovic 
(1999), Booth et al. (2000)). 
 
The second strand we draw on is the labour market literature 
(Fonseca et al. (2001), Pissarides (2001), and La Porta et al. (2003)). This 
literature studies the impact of labour market regulation on employment. 
Specifically, start-up costs (SU) and EPL are shown to affect job creation 
and entrepreneurship. Boeri et al. (2000) explain that EPL regulations may 
affect the equilibrium level of employment and its dynamics over the 
business cycle. Wasmer and Weil (2002) further establish a relationship 
between labour and finance market imperfections. Empirical evidence 
of EPL impact is mixed. Nickell et al. (2003) show how important EPL 
changes are on employment across OECD countries. Scarpetta and 
Tressel (2002) find that anti-competitive product market regulations are 
negatively associated with productivity performance. Furthermore, tight 
employment protection legislation has a negative impact on 
productivity. 
 
         The third strand of literature is related to growth, King and Levine 
(1993) and Levine (1997) show that finance matters for growth. 
Furthermore, La Porta et al. (1996), Levine (2003) claim that financial 
markets are better developed in countries with strong legal frameworks. 
Also related is the paper by Nicolleti et al. (1999) who argue that labour 
institutions and firm structure matter to growth. Koeniger (2002) finds that 
EPL decreases incentives to innovate and thus productivity growth 
depends on the degree of labour market competition. 
 
          Another set of interesting results comes from the industrial 
organisation literature. Industry distribution of employment differs sharply 
across countries, even among countries with similar levels of economic 
development. The theory of industrial organisation tries to determine 
which factors create these differences. Papers on international trade 
stress relative factor endowments and scale economies as major forces 
behind observed national differences in the industrial distribution of 
employment. However these differences extend to sectors that do not 
produce traded good and services. In addition differences in the 
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endowments also present a puzzle. Presumably, these countries have 
access to the same technologies for producing good and services. But 
firm and establishment size differ markedly across countries. A large body 
of previous studies find strong, systematic relationships between business 
size and other business characteristics such as financial structure, 
investment, job creation and job destruction (see Brown, Hamilton and 
Medoff (1990), Acs and Audretsch (1988,1990), Davis and Haltiwanger 
(1991,1996)).  
 
      Related to this literature and closer to our analyses, Kumar et al. 
(2001) investigate firm size in European countries to find factors 
correlated with firm size. They conclude that institutional factors like 
judicial efficiency and patent protection increase the difference in size 
between firms in capital intensive industries in comparison to firms in 
labour intensive ones. 
    
Despite the relation between firm size, job creation and economic 
growth, these various branches of the literature have not been 
combined in investigating empirically the effects of financial and labour 
imperfections on firm size and consequently on growth. 
 
For our empirical tests, we use the set up developed by RZ (1998) 
and adapted by Kumar et al (2001) to examine firm size determinants 
and to assess the relationship between financial development, labour 
and product market regulation and firm size. Both papers overcome 
identification problems encountered in standard cross-country growth 
regression by interacting a country feature (financial development) with 
an industry characteristic (external financial dependence of a particular 
industry). This approach is less subject to criticism regarding an omitted 
variable bias or model specification than traditional approaches and 
allow them to isolate the desired effect (Claessens and Laeven, 2003). 
        
We use industry-specific and country-specific data from a variety 
of sources. Industry data come from the UNIDO data base prepared by 
the OECD. We include data from 29 industrial sectors in 15 developed 
countries. Correlations in international comparisons may be biased by 
the degree of economic development. In particular, it has been 
generally accepted that the link between financial development and 
growth is influenced by the degree of development of the national 
economy. Actually, a certain degree of industrialisation is needed for the 
financial system to emerge (Becsi, Wang and Wynne, 1998). In other 
words, the demand for financial services is a prime driver of financial 
development (RZ, 2001). Therefore, despite the sample reduction, we 
consider interesting to analyse economies with a similar degree of 
development to obtain consistent results. Data for labour and product 
market regulation have been used in other cross-country studies. In 
  9particular, we use data from Fonseca et al (2001), La Porta et al. (2003) 
and Nickell et al. (2003) and Nicoletti et al. (1999) 
 
We find that tight labour regulation and anti-competitive laws 
have a detrimental effect on firm size, in particular to those firms which 
operate in less financially developed countries and therefore can be 
subject to higher financial constraints. These results are robust to different 
specifications and alternative measures of regulation. Moreover, we 
investigate the effects of these regulations on economic growth. In this 
case, the effect of EPL laws is weaker. However, product market 
legislation that delays firm establishment hinders growth significantly. 
These results may have policy implications since it is not only important to 
develop financial markets but also to pass the adequate labour norms 
and product market regulations such that there are no discouraging 
effects on firm size and entrepreneurship and therefore on growth. 
        
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3 presents the data used in our empirical application. 
Sections 4 and 5 present the model specification and main results 
respectively and Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. Related literature and Hypothesis 
 
Following Kumar et al. (2000) there are three conflicting strands of 
literature that try to explain the determinants of firm size. These are the 
technological, organizational and institutional explanations. The first 
hypothesis claims that the size of the market is a determinant of the 
extent of specialization and therefore, though indirectly, of the size of the 
firm. The second branch focuses on the variety of non-contractual 
mechanisms that can influence investment decisions, making them more 
efficient and hence fostering firm size. The third explanation relies on 
institutional factors that affect firm size. One of the channels through 
which institutions can affect firm size is finance. In particular, if the 
availability of external funds is important for firms to grow, firm size should 
be positively correlated with financial development and more generally 
with factors promoting the development of financial markets. Kumar et 
al. (2001) in a companion paper analyse the empirical validity of the 
three different hypothesis. However, they do not include market 
regulations or labour market institutions in their study and as we show 
next, these regulations can have an effect on implications for the size of 
the firms at level of industry. This is the gap we try to fill in this paper. 
 
Employment protection encompasses any set of regulations, either 
legislated or written in labour contracts. Therefore, EPL have an effect on 
cost structure. Furthermore, changes in labour market institutions are said 
to explain around 55 per cent of the rise in European unemployment 
  10from the 1960s to the first half of the 1990s, Nickell et al. (2003). Pissarides 
(2001) using a Pissarides-Mortensen model shows that employment 
protection is part of private contracts and when macroeconomic shocks 
take place this protection package should be changed along with 
wages and other features of the contract. Without this flexibility, the 
employment protection measures may alter the relative bargaining 
powers of established workers and employers, and alter wages and job 
creation. Second, there is a recent literature that studies the importance 
of start-up cost and barriers to entry in employment performance (see 
Fonseca et al. (2001)). Start-up costs discourage entrepreneurs, job 
creation decreases and employment has a lower level. These factors are 
important to explain differences in labour market performance across 
the OECD. 
     
Therefore, product and labour regulations have an influence on 
job creation and employment levels, the more detrimental the stricter 
the regulations. Strict labour protection affects negatively firm size, since 
entrepreneurs will be reluctant to increase the number of employees. 
However, the effect that relaxed market regulations may have on firm 
average size is an empirical matter. On the one hand, less barriers to 
entry and administrative burdens can enhance the entrance of new 
firms, reducing the average size of firms. On the other hand, incumbent 
firms may also increase in size due to decreasing starp-up costs and 
bureaucracy. 
 
In addition, RZ (1998, 2001) study the importance of financial 
institutions and financial markets economic activity. Financial 
development reduces the cost of external finance to firms and therefore 
eases firm access to external finance. But, under financial market 
imperfections, firms may experience difficulties in accessing external 
finance, and therefore may not be able to pay their obligations 
(included those derived from employment protection). Wasmer and Weil 
(2002) develop a matching model and introduce labour market 
institutions and financial markets imperfections and they conclude that 
financial restrictions are important in explaining employment and growth. 
Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) show for a UK sample that difficulties to 
access external finance discourage entrepreneurship and employment. 
Furthermore, there are papers that relate financial constraints to the 
duration of employment contracts. Rendon (2000) shows that liquidity 
constraints restrict job creation even when the labour market is flexible. 
He builds a dynamic model of labour demand with imperfect capital 
and labour markets where firms prefer temporary contracts to relax 
financial constraints. Hence the higher the difficulties to access external 
finance the more negative effect EPL and PMR have on job creation 
and firm size. 
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average firm size and growth. We are conscious that firm size is also 
affected by other factors previously underlined, but due to the nature of 
our data and we focus the study on the control for the other factors 
including sector and country fixed effects, and other control variables. 
 
3. Data  
 
3.1 Data Set 
 
This study uses a data set that combines industry level information 
on firm size, number of firms, number of employees, investment and 
access to external finance with country-level institutional variables, 
namely data on labour market. Industry data come from the Unido data 
base. We include data from 15 developed countries. Table 1 presents an 
overview of the variables used in the empirical analysis and their sources. 
Most of the variables are self-explanatory and have been used in 
previous studies of firm financing and firm structure. Together with this 
data, we have included information on external financial needs 
collected by RZ (1998). The period considered is 1981-1998, although the 
country coverage is not uniform. 
     
TABLE 1:  Definition and Source of the Variables 
Variable Name  Description 
Market size  Logarithm of total employment in that NACE three-digit industry in a country.  
   Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. 
Accounting  Accounting standards in 1983 (on a scale from 0 to 90). Higher scores indicate more  
  
disclosure. Source: Center for international Financial Analysis and Research and RZ 
(1998). 
Market cap  Stock market capitalization divided by GDP in 1980. Source RZ (1998) 
Domestic credit 
Domestic credit divided by GDP in 1980. Source International Financial Statistics of the 
International Monetary Fund. 
Fin Dependence 
External financial dependence of U.S. sectors averaged over 1980 - 1989. Source RZ 
(1998). 
EPL  Employment Protection Law data. This index captures the strictness of employment  
   protection laws. Sources: OECD, Blanchard and Wolfers (2000)and Nickell et al. (2003)  
PMR  Product Market Regulation data. This varible measures administrative burdens on  
  
the creation of corporate and sole proprietor businesses. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. 
(1997) 
Procedures  Number of procedures to set a firm. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997) 
Weeks  Number of weeks to set a firm. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997)  
Index 
The index is defined as (no. of weeks + no. of procedures/average procedures per 
week)/2 
   Source: Fonseca et al. (2001) 
start-up costs  Administrative burdens on startups Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997)  
Regulation  Regulatory and administrative opacicy.Source: LOGOTECH S.A. (1997) 
Barriers   Barriers to competition. Source: LOGOTECH, S.A. (1997) and Nicoletti.et at. (1999). 
Growth in avg 
size  Average growth  in average size by ISIC sector over the period 1981 to 1998.  
  Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. 
Growth in 
number 
Average growth  in number of establishment by ISIC sector over the period 1981 to 
1998.  
   Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial Statistics. 
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added  
Average annual real growth rate of value added in a particular sector by ISIC in a 
particular country  over the period 1981 – 1998. Source: UNIDO Database on Industrial 
Statistics. 
Legal origin 
Identifies the legal origin of the Company Law or Commercial Code of each country. 
Origins are: (1) English, (2) French, (3) German and (4) Scandinavian. Source: La Porta et 
al. (1999). 
Corruption  Source: La Porta et al. (1999). 
 
 
3.1.1 Industry-level data 
 
Traditionally, firm size has been measured in terms of value added, 
output or the number of employees. Value added is clearly preferable to 
output, because the complexity of the organization has to do with the 
value of its contribution not with the value of the output sold. However, 
as pointed out by Kuman, Rajan and Zingales (2001), when considering 
measures based on value added, coordination costs are not included, 
since they refer to the number of employees and not firm productivity. 
Furthermore, it is also argued that for some countries, particularly in 
Europe, value added per employee is fairly stable across different size 
classes. This implies that the measure of firm size based on the number of 
employees is likely to be very similar to one based on value added. This 
reasoning leads us to use a size measure in terms of the number of 
employees. We compute sector size by dividing total employment in the 
country-sector cell by the total number of firms in that combination. For 
the remainder of the paper, we refer to industry size as average size. 
 
RZ (1998) use three different definitions of economic growth: 
average growth in average size, average growth of value added, and 
growth in the number of establishments. Our model of growth examines 
the effect of EPL and PMR on financial dependent sectors. Most of the 
norms included in these variables are closely connected to the setting 
up of new firms. Therefore, we decide to use the average annual growth 
in number of establishments in a particular sector in a particular country 
over the period 1980 to 1989 as the benchmark case. However, we use 
the alternative measures as well. firms.  
 
RZ (1998) use the external financing needs of US companies to 
proxy for the demand of external funds in other countries. US capital 
markets are considered to be one of the most developed in the world 
economy, therefore, firm external capital raised can be a good proxy of 
their external financial demand. Kumar et al. (2001) correct the Rajan 
and Zingales measure of external dependence by the investment per 
worker in an industry; so they get the "per worker external financial 
needs" as a proxy of per capita external financial needs in other 
countries. The underlying assumption is that there are technological 
features that carry over countries, that is there are certain industries that 
depend more on external finance than others. Sectors more dependent 
on external finance behave better when capital markets are developed. 
  13Therefore, we introduce our proxy of external financial dependence 
interacted with the financial development. 
 
3.1.2. Country-level data 
 
Together with the industry data, we introduce institutional data to 
account for the nature of capital and labour markets. It is very hard to 
classify legal institutions and compress their description into indicators 
that are the essential input to statistical analysis (Giannetti et al., 2002). 
This difficulty is even greater in the case of the labour market because of 
its dynamics and complexity. However, different papers have recently 
introduced such measures successfully. We will focus on two different 
types of regulation: employment protection (EPL) and product market 
regulation (PMR), since the interaction of which with financial 
imperfections has not yet been empirically analysed. 
  
 
3.1.3. Financial Development 
 
Ideally, financial development should measure the ease with 
which borrowers and savers can be brought together (Rajan and 
Zingales (1998)). Therefore, financial development should be related to 
the variety of intermediaries and markets available. We use three 
different measures of financial development: stock capitalization, 
domestic credit and accounting standards. All of them have been 
widely used in the financial literature. 
 
3.1.4. Employment Protection Index 
 
This index captures the strictness of employment protection laws. 
The OECD collects information on employment protection. Blanchard 
and Wolfers (2000) using the OECD information together with data from 
Lazear (1990) and that reported in OECD Employment Outlook (1999) 
construct the initial index. This index is then enlarged and used by Nickell 
and Nunziata (2001) and Nickell et al. (2001) among others, providing an 
employment protection time varying variable (EPL) from 1960 to 1995.1
 
3.1.5. Regulation of entry 
 
    The data of product market regulation are taken by LOGOTECH, S.A. 
(1997). These data provide information about administrative burdens on 
the creation of corporate and sole proprietor businesses, and they were 
drawn from a study prepared for the European Commission. They 
represent the barriers to entrepreneurial activity (including administrative 
procedures) and they are divided in: (i) administrative burdens on start-
                                                 
1 Data are available by Luca Nunziata. 
  14ups2, (ii) regulatory and administrative opacity, and (iii) barriers to 
competition. These data are used by Fonseca et al (2001) and 
Nicoletti.et at. (1999) Djankov, S. et al. (2001) who use another data base 
on entry regulation for 1999. Given that our period of study finishes at 
1998 and in order to avoid spurious correlation, we decided to use the 
Logotech data base. 
 
3.2. Summary Statistics 
 
The differences between average size are quite large across 
countries. For example in the manufacturing, textile and paper sectors 
present small firm size in countries like Spain and Italy. Meanwhile, 
Germany and Sweden have large firm size. Therefore, it is very interesting 
to examine the sources of these disparities. Our aim is to analyse the 
institutional and regulation contribution in explaining this evidence (see 
Figure 1). In Table 2 we report the average of employment over 
establishment with some statistics for some countries of the sample.   
 

















Figure 1: Employment/Establishments by sector at country level 
 
 
                                                 
2 We have also analysed separately by number of procedures and number of weeks to open an 
establishment as well as the index analysed in Fonseca et al. (2001).  The index brings both components 
together. It averages the number of weeks that a new company on average need to start up with an 
approximate value for the number of weeks needed to complete the necessary number of procedures. 
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Table 2 Summary statistics average size. Unido 1981-98, 29 sectors 
 Mean  Stand.  dev.  Min  max 
Austria   109,74    85,39   1,049  1030,84 
Belgium    62,96    77,14   4,94       378,91 
Canada    86,38    75,99  14,92    375 
Denmark    53,38       44,00       2,76       210,20 
Finland   115,73     189,20       2,41     1450 
Ireland     51,20       40,04       9,09      244,44 
Germany   188,06     151,02     39,08      884,45 
Italy    104,36     126,20       1,96      862,31 
Japan     40,90       50,27       9,67      361,70 
New Zealand     26,26       37,42       1,39      290 
Netherlands   185,29     332,25  27,17     4944 
Norway     73,97       79,97       8,79      400 
Portugal   105,92     378,43       1     3727 
Spain     60,68     145,86       3,05  1000 
UK     72,94     121,79       6,5     1111,11 
Sweden   111,59       93,85     25,35       562,06 
 
 
4. Model Specifications 
 
4.1. Size model 
 
Our hypothesis is that labour and product market regulation can 
affect industry performance. The first model explores the effect of labour 
and market institutions on firm size, especially on external finance 
dependent industries. Therefore, the dependent variable is f irm  s ize  at 
sector level. We include the size of the market3 where the sector 
operates and two interaction terms. The first one interacts financial 
development in country k and external financial needs of sector j. The US 
external financial needs is used as a valid proxy following Rajan and 
Zingales (1998)4. The second interaction term adds the labour and 
market regulation measures in country k. We expect to find a positive 
and significant coefficient for the former and a negative one for the 
latter, indicating that more developed financial systems have a positive 
effect on size of those industries more dependent on external finance 
but this positive effect is hindered by tight labour and market regulation. 
Then the question we want to examine is whether financial market 
                                                 
3 The market size may be endogenous, therefore we instrument it. In the next section, we will explain the 
details. 
4 This approach has two main advantages. First, there is a technological reason why some industries 
depend more on external finance than others. Second, data on external financing is scarce, but in a 
perfect capital market the supply of funds to firms is perfectly elastic at the proper risk-adjusted rate, that 
is, in such a market the actual amount of external funds raised by a firm equals the desired amount. Since, 
it is the supply of funds the variable of interest, the identification problem disappears. 
  16imperfections and the interaction with the product market regulation 
and employment protection laws negatively affect firm size:  
 
  Sizej,k,t = α+ ψ0Sizej,k,t-1+ψ1*Market sizej,k,t+                  (1) 
    +ψ2*(external dependenceUS,j,t*financial developmentk,t)+ 
    +ψ3*(external dependenceUS,j,t*financial developmentk,t* 
    *labour regulationk,t)+ 
    +εj,k,t
 
 
4.2. Growth model 
 
In the second model we test whether industrial sectors that 
typically present larger size grow faster (slower) in countries with more 
(less) flexible product and labour market regulations. The idea is inspired 
by Claessens and Laeven (2003) who extend the Rajan and Zingales 
approach by introducing property right protection. Specifically, they test 
whether industrial sectors that typically use many intangible assets grow 
faster (slower) in countries with more (less) secure property rights. In line 
with Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Claessens and Laeven (2003), we use 
US industry data to construct proxies for the average size for a particular 
industry. The presumption here is that the well developed financial 
markets and the flexible labour and product markets in the US should 
allow US firms to achieve the desired financial and size structure. The 
underlying hypothesis is that US labour markets adapt better to the 
business cycles than other economy.  
 
Therefore, the dependent variable is the average annual growth in 
number of establishments in a particular sector in a particular country, 
with one observation per sector in each country. The specification for the 
first set of regression is as follows: 
 
 
  Growthj,k = α+ψ1*industry dummiesj+       (2) 
    +ψ2*country dummiesk
    +ψ3*(external dependenceUS,j*financial developmentk) 
    +ψ4*(average sizeUS,j*product and labour regulationk) 
    +εj,k
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To avoid possible biases caused by any omitted country-specific 
regressors, we have included country dummies to capture any 
institutional or other differences affecting growth, such as comparative 
advantage or general level of development. Since we are less interested 
in the importance of general country differences, we use this approach 
rather than a vector of specific country control variables. Still, as pointed 
out by Claessens and Laeven (2003), the use of country dummies could 
introduce a misspecification to the extent that any omitted institutional 
differences important for growth are correlated with our interaction 
variables. Industry dummies (not reported) are also included in all 
regressions. In line with Rajan and Zingales (1998), we include the 
industry’s market share in total manufacturing in a specific country, 
which has a negative sign in all regressions. 
 
 
5. Methodology and Results 
 
5.1 Size Model 
 
For the estimation of equation (1), we have selected an estimation 
method to avoid unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) describe how unobservable 
characteristics of the contracting environment may influence firm 
performance. In general, because firms are heterogeneous there are 
always characteristics influencing firm value that are difficult to measure 
or hard to obtain and which do not enter in our models (de Miguel et al. 
2002). Therefore, if we do not control for this heterogeneity, we risk 
obtaining biased results. Unlike cross-sectional analysis, panel data has a 
great advantage since allow us to control for unobservable 
heterogeneity through an individual effect. We also included a time 
variable to measure the temporal effect, so that we could control the 
effect of macroeconomic variables on firm size. 
 
Furthermore, the potential endogeneity of financial development 
may seriously affect the results. If we ignore the endogeneity issue we will 
obtain a spurious correlation. We estimate a dynamic model by using 
the generalized method of moments (GMM), which allows us to control 
for problems of endogeneity by using instruments. We apply first 
differences in order to eliminate the individual effects. A problem with 
the original Arellano-Bond estimator is that lagged levels are often poor 
instruments for first differences, especially for variables that are close to a 
random walk. Arellano and Bover (1995) described how, if the original 
equations in levels were added to the system, additional moment 
conditions could be brought to bear to increase efficiency. Therefore, 
we use the so-called system GMM estimator that combines the moment 
conditions for the model in first-differences with those for the model in 
  18levels. The main advantage of this estimator is that the extra moments 
condition remain valid when the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable is equal to one, even though the process is clearly not mean-
stationary5 (Bond et al. (2002)). 
 
If the residuals are heteroscedastic, then the two-step GMM 
estimator is more efficient (White, 1982). However, simulation exercises 
have shown that the asymptotic standard errors for the two-step 
estimation are not reliable because they are affected by a downward 
finite sample bias with the one-step procedure being more robust in this 
case. Windmeijer (2000) develops a finite-sample correction to the two-
step covariance. This can make the two-step robust procedure more 
efficient than the one-step robust procedure, one especially for system 
GMM. Therefore, we apply the two-step procedure 
 
The consistency of our estimates relies upon the hypothesis of 
absence of serial correlation in the error terms in the level equation. If the 
error terms are not serially correlated there should be evidence of 
significant negative first-order correlation but absence of second order 
correlation in the differenced residuals. The tests AR(1) and AR(2) 
reported in the table are consistent with the hypothesis of absence of 
second-order serial correlation and significant first order correlation. 
 
In Table 3 we report the results of regressions based on equation 
(1). Panel A, B and C present the results obtained when we proxy 
financial development with the stock market capitalization, credit 
market variable and accounting standards respectively. We add one 
interaction variable at a time. In all specifications the hypothesis of 
second-order serial correlation is always rejected (AR(2)). However, there 
is no lack of first-order serial correlation AR(1) in the differenced residuals, 
although the errors in the model in levels are not serially correlated. 
Another specification test used is Hansen's statistic of over-identifying 
restrictions, which tests for the absence of correlation between the 
instruments and the error term.    
 
Since Adam Smith (1776), economists have analysed the size of the 
market as a determinant of the extent of specialization, and indirectly 
the size of the firm. However, predictions have been conflicting, Kumar et 
al. (2001). Therefore, we consider interesting to include the size of the 
market in the analysis. One standard proxy for market size is total industry 
employment, but as pointed out by (Kumar et al. (2001)), theories refer 
clearly to the potential market. Furthermore, there may be spurious 
correlation between our dependent variable "average sector size" and 
our measure of market size. To correct for this, we instrument our measure 
of market size. As instruments we use legal origin Since we use US data to 
                                                 
5 This is no longer true if there are individual specific drifts. 
  19identify external dependence, we drop the United States in all 
regressions. 
 
The market size coefficient is negative and significant in all 
realisations. This confirms the theoretical scenario depicted by Becker 
and Murphy (1992) who question the conventional wisdom that 
specialization is limited by the size of the market and argue that 
coordination costs pose greater limits (this should be especially relevant 
in markets with asymmetric information). Kumar et al. (2001) obtain the 
opposite for the year 1992. Model 1, our benchmark specification, shows 
also that the interaction between external financial needs and financial 
development is positive and significant. Industrial sectors that are in need 
of external finance are larger in countries with more developed financial 
markets. Therefore, the positive effect on average size of incumbent firms 
(that are able to grow faster with financial development) offsets the 
"new entrant effect" that reduces average size.  
 
Model 2 introduces the EPL regulation. As can be observed, the 
positive effect of financial development is confirmed. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of the new interaction term is negative and significant. 
Therefore, tight employment protectio n  r e g u l a t i o n s  o f f s e t  p a r t  o f  t h e  
positive effects that financial development has on average size of more 
financially dependent sectors. When regulations are very strict, externally 
dependent sectors show more cautious about adjusting their workforce 
(Bertola, 1992). In addition, if hiring costs are not translated into lower 
wages, total labour costs for the firms increase and this may lead to a 
lower level of unemployment (Boeri et al., 2000).  In our case, this effect is 
shown to be especially harmful for externally financied sectors with high 
external financing needs, therefore showing up the interaction between 
financial and labour markets suggested among others by Wasmer and 
Weill (2002). Moreover, the negative coefficient is in line with Scarpetta 
(1996) and Nickell and Layard (1998) who document a detrimental 
effect of strict EPL. The rest of columns introduce market regulation 
interactions, one at a time. In general terms, barriers to entrepreneurship, 
bureaucratic procedures and delays hinder the promoting effect on 
average size. Namely, the number of weeks to set up a new 
establishment, the number of administrative procedures required and 
the administrative burdens to start ups affect negatively firm size of 
externally dependent sectors. However, the regulatory and 
administrative opacity does not seem to affect it. These results are 
coherent with the new theoretical results in the labour literature that 
claim that measures that impede entry of new establishments have a 





  205.2. Growth results 
 
So far, we have shown a significant effect of EPL and product 
market regulation on size. Next, we turn to growth. In particular we are 
interested in those sectors that are more labour intensive. This is an 
important issue, since international firms are reallocating their plants 
according to labour market flexibility factors. To do that, we rely on the 
set up first proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). In this seminal paper, 
growth in real value added is related to a number of country and 
industry-specific variables. In particular, they focus on the relevance that 
a developed financial market can have on financially dependent firms. 
They claim that financially dependent firms can be expected to grow 
more in countries with a higher level of financial development. The 
degree of financial dependency is computed using the US industry 
sectors. That is, they compute the "typical" sector external financial 
demand provided financial imperfections are not important. Claessens 
and Laeven (2003) introduce the "typical" ratio of intangible-to-fixed 
assets for each industrial sector together with an index of the strength of 
countries' property rights. They then test whether industrial sectors that 
typically use many intangible assets grow faster (slower) in countries with 
more (less) secure property rights. Both Rajan and Zingales (1998) and 
Claessens and Laeven (2003) use US data to construct proxies at the 
industry level for the typical ratio of intangible assets. The assumption 
here is that there are technological and economic reasons why some 
industries depend more on external finance and intangible assets than 
others do, and that these differences, to a large extent, prevail across 
countries. 
 
In line with these papers, we use US industry data to construct 
proxies for the typical average size for a particular industry. The 
presumption here is that the well developed financial markets and the 
flexible labour and product market in the US should allow US firms to 
achieve the desired financial and size structure. We then test whether 
industrial sectors that typically present larger firm size grow faster (slower) 
in countries with more (less) flexible product and labour market 
regulations. This does not mean that we assume that a particular sector 
in two countries with the same degree of flexibility in product and labour 
market to have the identical optimal size. We only assume that the rank 
order of size structure across industries to be similar across countries. 
 
We use the ratio of private credit-to-gdp as a proxy for financial 
development and we construct benchmark data on size on industry 
basis, as Rajan and Zingales (1998). We assume that the average size for 
each industry in the US forms a good benchmark. We measure average 
size using data on US sectors for the years 1980 to 1990 and compute 
average size by the ratio of employees to the total employees of the 
industrial sectors for each sector. Afterwards, we compute the mean of 
  21the period. We are conscious of the limits of this measure; a more 
accurate proxy could be computed correcting for the number of 
establishments  i n  e a c h  s e c t o r .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  w e  h a v e  o n l y  d a t a  o n  
establishment available for three years, so we decided to use the former 
proxy.  
 
The dependent variable is the average annual growth in number 
of establishments in a particular sector in a particular country over the 
period 1980 to 1989, with one observation per sector in each country. We 
decide to use this proxy for growth because most of the product market 
regulations included in the analysis affects mainly the entrance of new 
firms. However, the results when we introduce the growth in average size 
and value added are qualitatively similar6. The first regression includes 
the traditional financial interaction term alone. The subsequent ones 
include one labour regulation interaction at a time. Table 4 reports the 
main results 
 
The industry's market share in total manufacturing presents a 
negative sign in all regressions, suggesting that there is some industry-
specific convergence. In terms of the main hypothesis, we find that 
industrial sectors that rely more on external finance develop 
disproportionately faster in countries with better developed financial 
markets because the coefficient for the interactive variable credit to 
gdp times external financial dependence is positive and statistically 
significant (column 1). This result confirms the law and finance view that 
increased availability of external financing and better legal systems 
foster firm growth results are different with respect to product and labour 
interactions. On the one hand, strict EPL regulations do not affect firm 
growth of more labour intensive sectors (column 2). On the other hand 
more labour intensive industrial sectors bigger develop slower in countries 
with a more regulated product market, in particular for the number of 
weeks and procedures (column 3 and 4 respectively). These results 
suggest that EPL regulations are not so important for firm growth as some 
economists have postulated,  entry regulation laws, however, are very 
important. Therefore, much attention should be paid to these restrictive 
competition regulations that hinder growth. Scarpeta and Tressel (2002) 
suggest a similar conclusion when analysing productivity and 
convergence in a panel of OECD countries. Administrative burdens on 
start-ups and regulatory opacity do not affect firm growth (columns 7 
and 8) and barriers to competition seem to affect it positively (column 6). 
These results may suggest the weakness of the proxy variables and the 




                                                 
6 The standard proxies are growth in value added and sales growth. These results are reported for brevity. 
Available upon request from the authors.
  226. Conclusions 
 
Countries differ in their labour and product market regulations. This 
paper argues that these regulations affect firm size and firm growth 
significantly. First, under imperfect capital markets, firm are financially 
dependent and additional costs due to labour and market regulation 
may lead to suboptimal investment decisions and therefore hinder job 
creation and firm size. 
 
We have studied the firm size in a dynamic model. Our estimation 
results show that the interaction between external financial needs and 
financial development is positive and significant. Industrial sectors that 
are in need of external finance are larger in countries with more 
developed financial markets. Therefore, the positive effect on average 
size of incumbent firms (that are abl e  t o  g r o w  f a s t e r  w i t h  f i n a n c i a l  
development) offsets the "new entrant effect" that reduces average size. 
The following specifications introduce also interactions designed to test 
whether labour and product market regulations affect the “financial 
effect”, and we conclude that more strict employment protection laws 
and more barriers to the entrepreneurship affect to the firm size, specially 
to those sectors more dependent on external funds.  
 
The main insights of our results are that reforms in financial sectors 
are important to help performance, but also that are reforms in product 
markets also relevant. Hence, politicians should turn attention to market 
regulations that impede the normal market mechanism, which hinder 
growth significantly, especially to those sectors that are more labour 
intensive. These recommendations can be of interest for European 
countries, but also for transition economies. There is evidence of the 
evolution and development of European financial markets in the 
ninetie , which have made the gap with the US financial market smaller.  s   
Difference in product market and labour market regulations across 
countries seem essential to understand firm size disparities. Given the 
importance of this issue, we would like to extend our study using different 
variables more disaggregated information at a firm level on financial 
structure. 
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  27TABLE 3: Size equations 
PANEL A:  Financial development is Stock market capitalization 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L1 Lavempl  .9077*** .9166*** .9339  .9334*** .9339*** .9167*** .9170*** .9136*** 
  [.0148] [.0115] [7.854]  [.0107] [.0108] [.0116] [.0118] [.0127] 
Market size  -.0527*** -.0347*** -.0174  -.014     -.0197***   -.036***  -.0342*** -.0429*** 



















[.0145]   
EPL    -.0399**           
   [.0175]        
Regulatory,  
Adm opacity 





      -.0231^ 




     -.0412*   
[.0237]  
  
Weeks        -.0296**     
        [.0134]     
Procedures       -.4782***      
       [.0161]      
Index   .0497       
    [15.277]       
Constant .5757***  .4366***  .3062  .3126** .3275** .4587***  .4346***  .5921*** 
  [.1426] [.1254] [65.114]  [.1246] [.1353] [.1142] [.1172] [.1469] 
Observations  4196 4196 3478 3478 3478 4196 4196 4196 
Hansen test Х2 338.05    339.16 1755.90  268.04 267.23 342.29 338.20 339.03 
  (456) (573) (536) (536) (532) (622) (622) (622) 
AR(1)  -8.72*** -8.73*** -0.11  -8.27*** -8.29*** -8.71*** -8.72*** -8.71*** 
AR(2)  -0.06 -0.03 -0.06 -0.66 -0.64 0.00  -0.01 0.01 
Robust standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
coefficients for time dummies not shown         
 
 
  28PANEL B:  Financial develo
             
pment is Domestic credit 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
L1 lavempl  .9088*** .9185*** .9343*** .9335*** .9339*** .9191*** .9198*** .9142*** 
  [.0145] [.0101] [.1189] [.0107] [.0106] [.0114] [.0115] [.0122] 
Market size  -.0503*** -.0349***  -.0152  -.0119     -.0181**   -.035*** -.0323***  -.0414*** 
  [.0127] [.0101] [.2870] [.0085] [.0105] [.0091] [.0101] [.0119] 
External 
depend 
















[.0153]   
EPL    -.0467**             
   [.0195]          
Regulatory and  
Adm opacity 
        -.0138 
[.0121] 
Admin burdens  
on startups 





     -.0518** 
[.0233]    
   
Weeks     -.0315**     
        [.0133]     
Procedures       -.0498***      
       [.0165]      
Index    -.038       
    [.6193]       
Constant .6154***  .5092***  .2829  .2899** .3022** .4587***  .4442***  .5963*** 
  [.1444] [.1292] [4.2472]  [.1198] [.1382] [.1142] [.1217] [.1463] 
Observations  4196 4196 3478 3478 3478 4196 4196 4196 
Hansen test Х2 338.82    338.58 268.79 267.23 267.1  340.76 338.45 340.2 
  (456) (573) (536) (536) (532) (622) (622) (622) 
AR(1)  -8.70*** -8.75*** -6.27*** -8.27*** -8.29*** -8.71*** -8.72*** -8.7*** 
AR(2)  -0.03 -0.05 -0.61 -0.66 -0.65 0.00  0.00  0.02 
Robust standard errors in brackets      
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
coefficients  for  time  dummies  not  shown         
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PANEL C:  Financial development is accounting standards 
      
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
lavempl          
L1  .8965*** .9193*** .9305*** .9321  .9281*** .9085*** .9105  .9151*** 
  [.0151] [.0122] [.0676] [.8467]  [.0119] [.0131] [.6922]  [.0141] 
Market size  -.0522*** -.0289**  -.0184  -.0139     -.0238**   -.036*** -.0334  -.0398*** 
  [.0144] [.0123] [.8489] [.2009] [.0118] [.0109] [1.2262] [.0135] 
External 
depen 












[.0248]    
.0458 
[.9616] 
.0183    
[.0138] 
EPL   -.0535***            














     -.0412* 
[.0237]    
  
Weeks      -.0304**     
      [.0134]     
Procedures     -.0432      
     [ 4 . 3 6 0 ]       
Index    -.0347       
    [.0827]       
Constant .4581***  .4226***  .3180  .3344** .3275** .3744***  .3534  .5203*** 
  [.1252] [.1224] [.7812] [43.992]  [.1353] [.1205] [22.582]  [.1571] 
Observations  4196 4196 3478 3478 3478 4196 4196 4196 
Hansen test 
Х2
336.84    344.24 269.48 489.34 272.23 340.71 782.38 339.51 
  (456) (573) (536) (536) (532) (622) (622) (622) 
AR(1)  -8.71*** -8.71*** -7.28*** -0.32 -8.28***  -8.71*** -1.40  -8.69*** 
AR(2)  -0.08 -0.08 -0.64 -0.16 -0.65 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 
Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 





  30TABLE 4: GROWTH EQUATIONS 
PANEL A: Financial development is Domestic credit 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction of 
































































EPL   0.0043        
   [0.0078]        
Regulatory and 
Adm opacicy 
       -.0063 
[.0045] 
Admin burdens  
on startups 





     .0189** 
[.0093] 
  
Weeks      -.0018*     
      [.0009]     
Procedures     -.0033**      
     [0.0014]      
Index    -
.0038*** 
     
    [0.0014]         
Constant  0.095*** 0.096*** 0.088*** 0.089*** 0.088*** 0.095*** 0.096*** 0.095*** 
  [.0073] [.0073] [.0079] [.0079] [.0079] [.0072] [.0073] [.0073] 
Observations  3740 3740 2920 2920 2920 3740 3740 3740 
R-squared  0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
Coefficients  for  time  dummies  not  shown         
  31TABLE 4: GROWTH EQUATIONS 
PANEL B: Financial development is Accounting standards 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Fraction of 
























































EPL   0 . 0 0 0 0 9         














      -.0006*** 
[.00014] 
  
Weeks      .0001     
      [ . 0 0 0 0 5 ]      
Procedures      -.0001***       
     [.0001]      
Index    -.00004       
    [ . 0 0 0 0 4 ]        
Constant  .0058*** .0058*** .0057*** .0057*** .0057*** .0058*** .0058*** .0058*** 
  [.00024] [.00024] [.00028] [.00028] [.00028] [.00024] [.00024] [.00024] 
Observations  3730 3730 2900 2900 2900 3730 3730 3730 
R-squared  0.23 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Robust  standard  errors  in  brackets          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     
coefficients for time dummies not shown         
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